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Abstract
Information goods piracy is a pervasive problem as advanced information and communication technologies
become so inexpensive and so easy to access. This problem, if not alleviated, can pose a serious loss to society
as it can reduce information goods providers’ incentives to develop information goods or threaten the use and
growth of the Internet as a distribution media for valued digital information goods. Contrasting with previous
literature, which mainly consider instruments, such as law enforcement or technology-based solutions, that
work on increasing individual piracy cost, we consider using versioning as a complementary means to these
other methods. While the previous literature has shown that versioning may not be the optimal strategy for
information goods (having negligible or concave marginal costs), we show that versioning could be a very
effective and profitable instrument to fight piracy. Furthermore, we also show that it is possible to do this
without sacrificing the consumer’s surplus and, as a result, the entire social welfare could increase. This
suggests that by using versioning along with other instruments that work on increasing individual piracy cost,
information goods providers can fight piracy more efficiently.
Keywords:  Information goods, piracy, versioning, social welfare
Introduction
The emergence of the Internet and many advanced information and communication technologies (for example, peer-to-peer
computing) have provided a very low-cost reproduction and distribution medium for digitized information goods of all forms,
including text, images, data, audio, and video. On the other hand, these digital contents can be copied, or more exactly pirated,
easily and cheaply using the same technologies. As people rapidly gain access to the Internet and many new information and
communication technologies, the threat of piracy has never been greater.
The threat of piracy is nothing new for information goods due to their distinctive properties: an information good usually has a
high fixed cost of production but a low marginal cost of reproduction; it is also nonrival and often nonexcludable. Nonrival means
one person’s consumption doesn’t diminish the amount available to other people, while nonexcludable means that one person
cannot exclude another person from consuming the good in question (Varian 1998). Traditional ways to cope with piracy include
intellectual property laws that allow information goods to be excludable (although these laws are not necessarily being enforced).
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In addition, traditional information goods are usually attached to some physical media that is excludable, such as books that  only
one person can consume at a time. The bundle of information with excludable media also increases the cost of reproduction, and
thus the cost of piracy. Moreover, the pirated copy is usually of lower quality than the original copy with these traditional media;
for instance, a copied book doesn’t read as comfortably as the legal copy itself, which greatly reduces an individual’s incentive
to pirate.
On the other hand, the new medium itself (e.g., the Internet) does not allow purely digital information goods to be excludable
beyond the legal regime. Not only is excludability much more difficult to enforce, but quality for a pirated copy usually does not
degrade due to the digital nature of the information goods. As a result, the piracy problem becomes serious. If the piracy problem
is not alleviated, it will reduce information goods providers’ incentives to develop information goods and also seriously threaten
the use and growth of the Internet as a distribution media for valued digital information goods, because the information goods
provider may not want to put their valued information goods online, and this can potentially hurt society if most of the information
online is “trash.”  These concerns have contributed to researchers’ renewed interests in information goods piracy. Several
researches have discussed welfare implications of these new information and communications technologies as a distribution media
for digital information goods (Boldrin and Levine 2002; Duchene and Waelbroeck 2001; Klein et al. 2002), while others explore
possible government instruments or technology-based solutions to combat information goods piracy (Chen and Png 2003; Gayer
and Shy forthcoming).
Similar to previous literature on information goods piracy, we assume there is a monopolist information goods provider. However,
in contrast to previous studies on information goods piracy which generally focus on government instruments or technology
preventive controls, we consider versioning or quality differentiation as a possible instrument for the information goods provider
to fight piracy along with other commonly studied instruments that work to raise customer piracy cost through copyright
enforcement by the government or a technology-based solution (for example, encryption). Quality differentiation is a common
practice when there is customer heterogeneity and the seller can distinguish between them (e.g., second or third degree price
discrimination), for example, many software publishers sell a student version and a professional version; textbook publishers also
sell an international edition to some developing countries. Quality differentiation is also common for physical goods and has been
shown to boost profits for traditional physical goods. However, previous literature on information goods pricing has generally
shown that market segmentation with quality differentiation (or second degree price discrimination) is not optimal for  digital
information goods with zero marginal costs or concave cost function (Bhargava and Choudhary 2001, 2002; Jones and Mendelson
1997).  Although versioning may not be optimal for an information goods provider when there is no threat of piracy, we show
that it can be an effective and profitable instrument to fight piracy for digital information goods. We provide a practical model
that allows us to determine how many versions the information goods provider should offer, and at what quality levels and prices
under the threat of piracy. In addition, we show that versioning not only can enhance the producer’s profit, but can also be social-
welfare enhancing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The previous literature is surveyed.  We introduce our base model and a more
general model is formulated as a nonlinear mixed integer program.  Some text examples are shown and discussed, followed by
concluding remarks.
Literature Review
Much attention has recently been paid to information goods piracy.  Boldrin and Levine (2002), Duchene and Waelbroeck (2001),
and Klein et al. (2002) have studied the welfare implications of the new distribution technologies (in particular, peer-to-peer
distribution technology) and how these technologies might affect the copyright values of information goods. Other researchers
discuss possible strategies to combat information goods piracy. Gayer and Shy (forthcoming) study the effects of using hardware
taxation to compensate copyright owners. Chen and Png (2003) examine how the government should respond to information
goods piracy using three instruments—fines, taxes, and subsidies. In addition to these government initiated strategies, Ben-Shahar
and Jacob (2001) study how information goods creators can engage in selective copyright enforcement. Some other researchers
have studied information goods pricing under the threat of piracy. For example, Belleflamme (2002) studies how different copy
technologies (either with fixed cost or with marginal cost) affect information goods pricing, under the assumption that copies are
low-quality alternatives to originals. 
Other research that may be relevant to information goods piracy is software piracy, which has also received extensive attention
previously due to one of its special characteristics, namely, demand-side network externality. Conner and Rumelt (1991), Shy
and Thisse (1999), and Takeyama (1994) suggest that, in the presence of network externality, piracy increases the installed base,
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which in turn raises the demand and willingness to pay for the legitimate copy of the software and thus can potentially increase
the producer’s profit. As a result, they conclude that not protecting, even with serious software piracy, can be the best policy.
Other issues about software piracy have also been studied. For example, Gopal and Sanders (1997) have discussed both preventive
and deterrent controls for software piracy, where preventive controls employ technology-based solutions to make copying software
more difficult; deterrent controls attempt to dissuade users from copying software through legal, investigative, and educational
campaigns. They also study, in the context of international software piracy, the government’s incentive to enforce laws against
piracy and the cultural differences in piracy propensity and behavior. Cheng et al. (1997) have identified some of the reasons why
people pirate software.
The Base Model
Varian (1997) suggests that “the right way to design the product will generally be to design for the high end of the market first,
and then downgrade the product to get the versions for the other segments of the market”. Therefore, in our base model, we first
assume that the firm has already sunk its investment in producing the information good of best quality with quality index 1, and
can degrade the product at negligible cost.  Following previous literature (Belleflamme 2002; Bhargava and Choudhary 2001;
Mussa and Rosen 1978), we assume a customer’s (say i) reservation price for the product with quality index Q, ,0 1Q≤ ≤
decreases linearly, that is, ViQ, where Vi is the customer’s willingness to pay for the good with quality index 1. Given our context
of digital information goods, it is reasonable to assume zero or very small marginal cost in reproducing any version of information
goods, furthermore, we assume that the pirated copy will have the same quality level as the original copy since these goods are
digital in nature. Each individual also has a cost of piracy, Ti, which depends on the level of protection technology (in the case
that a preventive control is used) and also includes the cost of the copying medium (which can be zero) and moral cost, if any,
as well as the expected loss if caught (which equals the probability of being caught times the fine demanded).
As a base model, we assume there are two types of customers in the market. The high type has a reservation price of VH for the
good with best quality normalized to one, which is greater than the reservation price of a low type, VL, for the good of best quality.
The reservation price for the product with reduced quality, , is thus ViQ, with i = H or L.  Suppose there are " high0 1Q≤ ≤
type and (1-") low type, and the firm can’t distinguish between these two types of customers.
Optimal Pricing Strategy Wthout Considering Piracy
Given that there are two types of customers, the firm will offer at most two versions of the product :  one with the best quality
with quality index 1 and price P1, which is intended to be sold to the high-end type customers and the other at quality level Q with
price PQ for the low-end type customers. For simplicity, we write these two versions as (1, P1) and (Q, PQ). Note that we are not
constraining the firm to offering two versions.  If the optimal Q is found to be one, then we know only one version, (1, P1), will
be offered and both types of customer will buy it.  When the optimal Q is found to be zero, then again only one version, (1, P1),
is offered, and only the high-end type customers will buy it.  Note also that it is never the best strategy to offer a single version
of the product with quality level less than one since the firm can always increase profits by increasing quality.1
With these two versions, (1, P1) and (Q, PQ), offered, a high-end type customer will buy (1, P1) if and only if her net surplus from
buying is greater than that from not buying (with zero utility) and from buying (Q, PQ). That is, the following two constraints must
hold for the high-end type customer to buy (1, P1).
(1) H is willing to buy (1,P1) over not buying.1 10H HV P P V− ≥ ⇒ ≤
(2)  H is willing to buy (1,P1) over (Q,PQ)1 1 (1 )H H Q H QV P V Q P P V Q P− ≥ − ⇒ ≤ − +
Likewise, for a low-end type customer to buy (Q, PQ), we must assure that her net surplus from buying is greater than that from
not buying (with zero utility) and from buying (1, P1). That is, the following two constraints must hold for the low-end type
customer to buy (Q, PQ).
Wu et al./Fighting Information Goods Piracy with Versioning
620 2003— Twenty-Fourth International Conference on Information Systems
(3) L is willing to buy (Q,PQ) over not buying0L Q Q LV Q P P V Q− ≥ ⇒ ≤
(4) L is willing to buy (Q,PQ) over (1,P1).1 1 (1 )L Q L Q LV Q P V P P P V Q− ≥ − ⇒ ≤ − −
It is in  seller’s interest to increase the price as much as possible, so in general one of the first two inequalities, (1) and (2), will
be binding, and one of the latter two inequalities, (3) and (4), will be binding. We can show that (1) and (4) will not be binding
through proof by contradiction, so we know that constraints (2) and (3) are binding.
Q LP V Q=
1 (1 ) (1 )H Q H LP V Q P V Q V Q= − + = − +
The firm’s profit function is thus: 
1 (1 ) [ (1 ) ] (1 )Q H L LP P V Q V Q V Qπ α α α α= + − = − + + −
The firm will then choose Q to maximize its profit. Since , which is a constant,(1 )H L L L HV V V V VQ
π α α α α∂ = − + + − = −
∂
we know the optimal Q is of boundary values, either one or zero depending on whether  or not. Thus the firm’sL HV Vα≥
optimal strategy is always to provide only one version, that is, versioning is never optimal!
 
Proposition 1:  When the marginal cost for the digital information good is zero, the provider’s optimal pricing strategy is always












Note that this result can be extended to cases where there are more than two types of customers, which has been demonstrated
by Bhargava and Choudhary (2002) and by Jones and Mendelson (1997). 
Optimal Pricing Strategy When Considering Piracy:  When Piracy Cost Is Symmetric
Now let’s take a look at the case with piracy.  Assume the customers face a common piracy cost, T.  Note that for any price higher
than this piracy cost, a customer will prefer to pirate the produce than to buy it. In addition, we assume an individual will always
pirate the product with the best quality once she decides to pirate (since it gives the highest surplus). 
For the high-end type (H) customers, there is an additional constraint in addition to constraint (1) and (2) introduced earlier: the
surplus from buying must be greater than the surplus from pirating:
1 1H HV P V T P T− ≥ − ⇒ ≤
Likewise, there is an additional constraint for the low-end type customers (L):
(1 )L Q L Q LV Q P V T P T V Q− ≥ − ⇒ ≤ − −
To summarize, here’s the objective function faced by the seller:
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As before, equations (1) and (4) will not be binding, so we know that to induce the high-end type customers to buy, the following
constraints need to hold:
1 (1 )H QP V Q P≤ − +
1P T≤
And to induce the low value customers to buy, the following constraints need to hold:
Q LP V Q≤
(1 )Q L L LP T V Q T V V Q≤ − − = − +
This implies that when , we need  only; when , we need only.LT V< (1 )Q LP T V Q≤ − − LT V≥ Q LP V Q≤
With this setting, we can show that when , the firm’s optimal strategy considering piracy is always to offer just oneLT V<
version at best quality and set price at T and get profit T, consistent with previous result without considering piracy. Interesting
results come when we have . L HV T V≤ ≤






optimal pricing strategy is to offer two versions:  (1, T), which is sold to the high-type customers, and ,
( )( , )H L H
H L H L
V T V V T
V V V V
− −
− −
which is sold to the low-type customers. 
Since the piracy cost is also, to some extent, under the control of the firm, we can derive the seller’s optimal investment level for
piracy control. This investment may include the investment in technology-based preventive control to make it more difficult to
pirate or to enhance the investment’s monitoring infrastructure to increase piracy detection rate, which will then influence end
users’ piracy cost in turn since the probability a pirate will get caught increases. Assume that the firm can increase the piracy cost
at  cost, F(T), where . For analytical convenience, we’ll simply assume it takes the quadratic function( ) 0 and ( ) 0F T F T′ ′′> ≥
form: , where a is the cost parameter. With this cost function, we can show the optimal level of piracy cost, which2( )
2
aF T T=
is set indirectly by the firm. 





(depicted in Figure 2): 
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Optimal Pricing Strategy When Considering Piracy:  When Piracy Cost is Asymmetric
Previous results can be generalized to the case when people have different piracy cost, for example, some people might face very
high piracy cost and will never pirate. Following Chen and Png (2003), we call these people the ethical people, and assume that
a proportion, e, are the ethical people and will never pirate, while the others with proportion (1-e) will consider pirating if there
is greater surplus for doing so. We further assume that whether a customer is ethical or not is independent on whether the customer
is a high-end type or low-end type. As before, we assume that for people who will consider to pirate (i.e., the unethical group),
they face a non-zero piracy cost, T, and a customer will always pirate the product with the best quality if deciding to pirate. 
In this case, we have four types of customers:
WTP for a product with Q High-end type (") Low-end type (1-")
Ethical (e) VHQ VLQ
Unethical (1-e) Min {T, VHQ} Min {T, VLQ}
As before, we find that under some conditions, the single version with best quality is still optimal, but when piracy cost, T, is
within some range, the firm can use versioning to increase its profits when facing the threat of piracy.
Proposition 4:  When , the firm’s optimal strategy considering piracy is always to offer just one version at best qualityLT V<










when T > max{e"VH ,eVL}.  
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pricing strategy is to offer two versions:  (1, T), which is sold to the high-end value customers, and , which
( )( , )H L H
H L H L
V T V V T
V V V V
− −
− −
is sold to the low-end value customers.
Results from Proposition 4 and 5 are summarized in Figure 3. As before, we derive optimal investment level for piracy control
in Figure 4. 
Note that results from the previous two subsections show that when piracy cost, T, is under a certain range, versioning can boost
the seller’s profits, suggesting that versioning can be an effective complementary instrument to other instruments available to the
seller that increases individual piracy cost, such as investment in technology to make it harder to pirate or increase piracy detection
rates. On the other hand, versioning can also be a substitute forthe seller’s investment of piracy control, because without
versioning, the seller may have to investment more in technology or monitoring infrastructure, but with versioning, the seller can
get higher profit with less cost invested in piracy control. Overall, our findings here suggest that by using versioning along with
other instruments that work on increasing individual piracy cost, information goods providers can fight piracy more efficiently.
The General Model
In the previous section, we consider the base model in which there are high-end and low-end types of customers who could have
either high or low piracy cost. In this section, we consider a more general model of the problem in which there are more than two
types of customers and possibly more than two versions offered. In other words, we formulate the optimal pricing and versioning
problem for a monopoly information goods provider that sells one product (but possibly multiple versions in quality) to I types
of customers (or market segments), each type, i, is characterized by two parameters: reservation price, Vi, and piracy cost, Ti. Note
that I can be as small as one and as many as the total number of customers out there, depending on the similarity among customers
in the market. Also, if two groups of customers have the same reservation price but different piracy cost (or vice versa), they will
be accommodated in our model as two different types. While it may be possible for the information goods provider to distinguish
customers by their reservation prices, it will be very difficult for the provider to also know their piracy cost, therefore, in our
model, we assume that the provider cannot distinguish between customers of different types.
The model is developed from the seller’s perspective. The problem for the seller is to decide how many different versions to offer,
and at what quality levels and prices to maximize its net profit subject to a set of consumer participation and incentive constraints
under the threat of piracy. From the customer’s perspective, each customer will want to maximize her consumer surplus based
on the difference between the reservation price for each version provided by the supplier (as well as the unauthorized or piracy
copy) and the price they pay. The seller has to take into account dimensions of the customer’s optimization problem which appear
as constraints in the seller’s problem. 
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Our goal is to offer a general model that can be used in practice, so we will accommodate in our model some of the practical
constraints often observed in practice. While the marginal cost of information goods may be zero, the provider may still incur
some other cost for having different versions of the product for sale.  This may include costs from greater management complexity
(we call it menu cost here) due to multiple versions and/or possible product completion cost (which is a fixed cost to the seller),
which may be due to the cost to tailor and modify the product for different quality level versions. Although for some digital
information goods, product completion cost may be small, in some other cases, there may exist a fixed cost to change or degrade
product quality. Another practical constraint in reality is that it is rarely the case that quality can be treated as a continuous variable
and that the provider can set any quality level it wishes. In fact, the possible quality levels achievable are often limited by available
technology. So, the maximum number of versions, J, the provider can possibly offer is constrained by both the technology and
by consumer processing capability. Note that this assumption does not restrict the applicability of our model, but rather, it enriches
the scenarios we can possibly accommodate since J can be as small as one or as large as infinity. However, it is also important
to note that the provider will never want to offer more versions than the number of customer types, I, out there.
We model the problem of optimal pricing and versioning of information goods as a nonlinear mixed integer program. Table 1
provides the definitions of all the parameters and variables used in this model.
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The objective function (1) is to maximize the total net profits of the vendor. This is calculated by the summation of profits
obtained from each type of customer net the total fixed cost, if any, incurred by the vendor. Each constraint is explained in the
following.
Constraint (2) defines consumer surplus as the difference between the customer’s reservation price for version j (with quality index
Qj) and the market price of the version she chooses or, if she decides to pirate, the difference between her reservation price of the
product and her piracy cost. As before, we assume that the consumer will always pirate the product with highest quality if she
decides to pirate. Constraints (3) and (4) ensure that each customer maximizes her surplus Si. This is achieved by requiring the
final consumer surplus to be no less than the consumer surplus from any other version offered by the seller or from pirating
(incentive compatible constraints). Constraint (5) and (6) ensure that a consumer will choose a version (or piracy copy) only when
her surplus on this choice is nonnegative (individual rationality constraints); otherwise, she won’t choose this version (or piracy
copy).  Constraint (7) ensures the assumption that each customer will purchase exactly one version (or the unauthorized copy),
or won’t make a purchase at all.  Constraint (8) ensures that only when the vendor offers the jth possible version of the product,
can customers choose this kind of version; otherwise, no such choice is available. Constraint (9) is a nonnegative constraint for
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the product price. Constraints (10) to (12) enforce the integer property of the decision variables with respect to consumer choices
and version offering.
We provide an approach using Lagrangean relaxation and subgradient methods to solve this complicated nonlinear mixed integer
program. A relaxed problem is solved first, and then heuristics are used to obtain optimality of the original problem IP. But due
to the space limit enforced by the conference, detailed technique about how to solve the problem is omitted here and only the
computational results are presented in the following section.
Table 1.  Definitions of the Parameters and Variables Used in the Model
Given Parameters
I: There are total I types of customers (or market segments) in our target market.
J: The maximum number of different quality levels (or versions) the vender is able to offer to the users. These different
quality levels are indicated by Qj, where 0 < QJ < … < Qj+1 < Qj < … < Q1 = 1. For simplicity, we’ll simply assume these
quality levels are evenly distributed, that is, Qj = (J-j + 1)/J.
Cj: Product completion cost as well as the menu cost for providing the jth possible version of the product on the menu.
.0jC ≥
Mj: Marginal cost for providing the jth possible version of the product to a customer. 0jM ≥
Ni: Anticipated size of market segment i.
Ti: Piracy cost for type i customers. 
Vi: Reservation price for type i customers for the product with quality index 1. 
Decision Variables
Pj: The price the vender would charge for the jth possible version of the product. 
Si: Consumer surplus of a customer in market segment i.
Xij: The decision variable which is 1 if type i customers choose to buy the jth possible version of the product and 0 otherwise.
Yj: The decision variable which is 1 if the vender chooses to offer the jth possible version of the product on the menu and 0
otherwise.
Zi: The decision variable which is 1 if type i customers choose to pirate and 0 otherwise.
Numerical Results and Case Analysis
A Detailed Example 
In this subsection, we first randomly generated a test example and use it to demonstrate the ideas of providing multiple quality
versions to fight piracy.  Some more examples are presented later, but due to the space constraint, only the final results are
presented.
The major assumptions and parameters used in this subsection are listed below:
1. We assume there are five market segments (I = 5) and the firm can only provide up to four different quality versions (J = 4)
with quality index Q1 = 1, Q2 = 0.75, Q3 = 0.5, and Q4 = 0.25, which are constrained by available technology.
2. The product completion cost Cj and marginal cost Mj of providing different versions to the customers are assumed to be 0.
3. The number of customers in the market segments are randomly generated between 1k ~ 10k with N1 = 6000, N2 = 7000, N3
= 2000, N4 = 2000, and N5 = 7000.
4. The piracy cost of the customer in market segments are randomly generated between 0 ~ 100 with T1 = 26, T2 = 51, T3 = 66,
T4 = 11, and T5 = 67.
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5. The market segment’s reservation prices for the most high-end version of the product are randomly generated between 0 ~
100 with V1 = 96, V2 = 76, V3 = 22, V4 = 3, and V5 = 12.
The Single Version Case
If the firm is only offering the most high-end version of the product to the customer, it is not hard to see that in order to make the
product attractive to the customers in a given market segment, the price of the product should not be higher than both this market
segment’s reservation price V and piracy cost T. For example, to sell the product to market segment 1, the price of the product
shouldn’t be higher than T1.  When the firm sets the price at T1, the customers in segment 1 will be indifferent between buying
the product from the firm and buying the pirated copy as these both give them the same consumer surplus. It follows that the
demand of the product from this market segment will be somewhere between 0 and N1, depending on how these indifferent
customers decide. This indifference could be resolved easily by charging a price slightly less than T1 on the product (even just
a small fraction of one cent). By doing so, these customers will be willing to buy the official version of the product since now they
get higher utility from buying than copying. Actually, the distinction between a price of exactly T1 and a price slightly less than
T1 is purely theoretical and the distinction can be safely ignored in practice. The same tie breaking idea could be used in the case
of offering multiple quality versions.  We could reasonably assume that, faced with two alternatives that give the same consumer
surplus, the customer will choose the official copy over the pirated copy and the high-end version over the low-end version.
In addition, because we assume all customers within a market segment have the same reservation price, the demand curve is a
step function and the possible optimal values of the price are given by min{Vi, Ti}, i = 1,…, I. To find the optimal price of the
single version offering, we only have to compute and compare all profits we could get from these possible values of the price.
The conclusion: the firm should offer the most high-end version of the product at 51. This choice promises the highest profit level
for the firm of 357,000 and customers in market segment 2 will buy the product while the customers in market segments 3, 4, and
5 won’t buy the product and market segment 1 will do the piracy.
The Multiple Versions Case
The question we would like to ask is, given the market research parameters above, could the firm do better by offering more than
one quality version of the product?  If so, which versions should it offer?  At what prices?
We apply our algorithm proposed in the previous section to this test example and our algorithm suggests the following solution:
the firm should offer two quality versions of the product, with quality index 1 and 0.75, priced at 26 and 9 respectively to the
market. With this product offering, market segments 1 and 2 will buy the high-end version of the product and market segments
3 and 5 will now buy the low-end version of the product. Note that in order to attract segment 1 while keeping segment 2 buying
the high-end product, the firm has to lower the high-end product price from 51 to 26.  Although market segment 4 is still left out
of the market because they have too low a reservation price, market segments 3 and 5 will now buy the low-end product and get
to enjoy the benefit of the product; in addition, market segment 1 will no longer pirate but will now buy the product (the results
are summarized in the Table 2)! The profit level achievable with versioning is now 419,000, or 17.37 percent more than the
highest net profit with only the most high-end version of the product. 
Table 2. : Using Versioning to Fight Piracy
Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 Segment 4 Segment 5
Single Version











The Total Social Welfare
Based on the test example just shown, we find that offering several quality versions of the product has two welfare implications.
First, the firm is able to improve its profit level with versioning under the threat of piracy. In this case, the profit improvement
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comes from the consumers in two ways:  from segments 3 and 5 who won’t buy the product and from segment 1 who will pirate
if only one high-end version is offered. Although the sales from market segment 2 shrink due to lower price, it is still well
compensated by the sales from the new customers. Second, versioning can reduce social deadweight loss by bringing more
customers to the market since more people can enjoy the products with versioning. 
In addition, it is worth noting that that no customers lose any surplus when the firm offers multiple versions of the product in this
case. Instead, more customers are covered in the market with higher surplus. As a result, the total social welfare increases about
26.47 percent in this example:  the firm is able to earn more and more customers are able to enjoy the benefits of the product. In
other words, versioning can be a win-win situation for both the firm and the customers (although not for thepirated-copy
merchants).
Other Test Examples
In this section, we present more test examples, however, due to the space constraint, only the final results of the examples are
presented in Table 3.  Detailed results are available upon request. The results, once again, suggest that versioning can be an
effective and profitable instrument to fight piracy in many cases. 



















Case 1 (3, 2) 0 0 1k ~ 10k 0 ~ 100 0 ~ 100 2 24.61 % 14.71 %
Case 2 (3, 2) 10 ~ 50 0 1k ~ 10k 0 ~ 100 0 ~ 100 2 28.81 % 9.17 %
Case 3 (3, 2) 100 ~ 500 0 ~ 10 1k ~ 10k 0 ~ 100 0 ~ 100 2 24.60 % 29.95 %
Case 4 (6, 4) 0 0 1k ~ 10k 0 ~ 100 0 ~ 100 2 12.17 % 15.14 %
Case 5 (6, 4) 10 ~ 50 0 1k ~ 10k 0 ~ 100 0 ~ 100 2 18.18 % 12.47 %
Case 6 (6, 4) 100 ~ 500 0 ~ 10 1k ~ 10k 0 ~ 100 0 ~ 100 2 22.45 % 40.71 %
Case 7 (10, 10) 0 0 1k ~ 10k 0 ~ 100 0 ~ 100 2 11.69 % 9.69 %
Case 8 (10, 10) 10 ~ 50 0 1k ~ 10k 0 ~ 100 0 ~ 100 2 16.09 % 20.23 %
Case 9 (10, 10) 100 ~ 500 0 ~ 10 1k ~ 10k 0 ~ 100 0 ~ 100 2 16.08 % 6.31 %
Concluding Remarks
Information goods piracy is a pervasive problem as advanced information and communication technologies become so
inexpensive and easy to access. This problem, if not alleviated, can pose a serious loss to society.  For example, piracy may reduce
information goods providers’ incentives to develop information goods if they can’t cover their fixed cost. In addition, piracy may
threaten the use and growth of the Internet as a distribution media for valued digital information goods. 
Several instruments have been proposed previously to alleviate the information goods piracy problem, such as stronger
enforcement of the laws or technology preventive means, both of which directly increase the piracy cost faced by individuals.
However, stronger law enforcement can be difficult and very costly, and technology preventive controls can often be “cracked.”
In this paper, we consider using versioning as a complementary means to these other methods. We construct a model that allows
us to determine how many versions, at what quality level, and at what prices the information goods provider should adopt given
the demand it has and the piracy costs its customers face. We show that versioning can be a very effective and profitable
instrument to fight piracy. The improvement in profit level could come from two sources: from those who did not buy without
versioning and from those who pirated. Furthermore, we also show that it is possible to do this without sacrificing the consumer’s
surplus and, as a result, the entire social welfare could increase. This suggests that by strategically using all of the instruments
available, including versioning and other piracy controls which raise customer piracy cost, information goods providers can fight
piracy more efficiently, and this has important welfare implication in the long run, as it can preserve the information goods
provider’s incentive to develop information goods and use the Internet as an efficient distribution channel.
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When , by reorganizing terms, we will notice that only one of the latter three inequalities, equation (4), will beL HV T V≤ ≤
binding, and that equation (1) will not be binding. So we need to consider equations (2), (3), and (4) only. Given that the seller
will want to charge P1 and PQ as high as possible, we have:








The seller will then choose a Q that maximizes its profit subject to these two equalities. .  Thus1* arg max (1 ) QQ P Pα α= + −
we get: 
.  QED.1
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− −
Proposition 3:
Proof sketch:  T* is solved by maximizing the seller’s net profit, i.e. . QED.1* arg max (1 ) ( )QT P P F Tα α= + − −
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Where D1 is the demand for version (1, P1) and DQ is the demand for version (Q,PQ). Also we use E to indicate ethical consumers,
and NE to indicate customers who might pirate, so EH represents ethical high-end type people while NEH stands for non ethical
high-end type people.
To induce EH to buy, constraints (1) and (2) need to be satisfied, while to have NEH to buy, (1), (2), and (5) need to hold.
Likewise, to have EL to buy, we need (3) and (4) satisfied, and to have NEL to buy, (3), (4), and (6) need to hold.
With these conditions, we have some observations:  EH will always buy; if NEH buys, all the rest will buy; if NEL buys, then
EL will also buy; and when T>VL, NEL will buy whenever EL buy. With these observations, we can get demand under different
situations, and with the demand and the condition’s need to be satisfied, we can solve the profit maximization problem in a similar
manner as the proof of proposition 2.  QED.
